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Abstract
Do sudden, large wealth losses affect mental health? We use exogenous variation in the interview
dates of the 2008 Health and Retirement Study to assess the impact of large wealth losses on
mental health among older U.S. adults. We compare cross-wave changes in wealth and mental
health for respondents interviewed before and after the October 2008 stock market crash. We find
that the crash reduced wealth and increased feelings of depression and use of antidepressant drugs,
and that these effects were largest among respondents with high levels of stock holdings prior to
the crash. These results suggest that sudden wealth losses cause immediate declines in subjective
measures of mental health. However, we find no evidence that wealth losses lead to increases in
clinically-validated measures of depressive symptoms or indicators of depression.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
Do sudden, large wealth losses affect mental health? Despite a large literature on the
relationship between socioeconomic status and health, the answer to this question is not
known. Most prior studies that use exogenous shocks to identify the causal effects of income
on health exploit natural experiments that increase income or lead to wealth accumulations;
of these, only a few examine mental health outcomes. These studies show that income
increases associated with lottery winnings lead to mental health improvements (e.g., Apouey
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and Clark, 2010), while receiving a bequest has no significant effect on mental health (e.g.,
Kim and Ruhm, 2010). However, the mental health effects of losing money have not been
examined, despite the fact that a number of life events such as divorce, widowhood, and
expensive medical episodes can trigger significant declines in material well-being. This may
be because these events typically confound the wealth effects they engender.
Research on the consequences of wealth loss is especially important if the effect of wealth is
asymmetric. Results from economics and psychology experiments provide ample evidence
that individuals respond differently to losses than gains. Subjects in experiments often place
a higher value on a good that they own compared to an identical good that they do not own
(the endowment effect). One explanation for this effect is loss aversion, which explains that
the disutility of losing a good is greater than the utility of obtaining it (e.g., Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984). Further, the effects of large wealth losses may be more disruptive than
generalizations of the effects of small gains or losses may suggest. It could take years of
favorable stock market returns to recapture wealth losses, whereas small losses can be offset
by an increase in work hours or a short-term change in consumption patterns. If the
psychological or economic consequences of losses differ in these ways, then prior studies
that focus on the effects of sudden gains in socioeconomic status may offer little guidance
on the effects of losses on mental health.
In this study, we identify the effect of large wealth losses on mental health by focusing on
the immediate and largely unexpected declines in the net worth of U.S. households brought
on by the stock market crash that occurred in the fall of 2008. In the 8-day trading period
that began on October 1, 2008, the closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) fell by nearly 2,400 points or roughly 22%. After a small uptick, the DJIA fell
throughout the month; by the end of October, the index had reached its lowest level since
2003. By December 2008, retirement accounts had lost almost one-third of their value on
average, and total losses were estimated at $2.8 trillion (Soto, 2008). Our identification
strategy uses variation in the timing of interview dates for the 2008 wave of the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). Specifically, we examine respondent-specific changes in wealth
and mental health between the 2006 and 2008 waves of the HRS, comparing changes for
respondents whose 2008 interview took place before October of that year with the changes
experienced by those interviewed after the October 2008 stock market crash. We allow the
effects of the crash to vary by respondent's exposure, which we measure in pre-crash wealth
in stocks and individual retirement accounts.
Respondents interviewed post-crash lost significantly more non-housing wealth between the
two survey waves than respondents interviewed before the crash. Results from several
falsification and placebo tests suggest that our post-crash indicator identifies the effects of
the stock market crash separately from the effects of changes in the housing market or the
unobservable traits of respondents interviewed later in the year.
We find mixed evidence of an effect of the crash on mental health. Subjective measures of
mental health, such as “feeling depressed” and self-rated health, worsened among
respondents interviewed post-crash compared to those interviewed prior to October 2008.
These effects were concentrated among those respondents who lost more wealth in the crash
(i.e., the wealthier half of stockholders). Although the crash had no effect on clinically-
validated measures of depression, respondents who lost more wealth in the crash also
showed large increases in antidepressant use.
2. Previous Literature
A key distinction between our work and prior studies in this literature is that we examine an
exogenous event that reduced wealth.1 Most prior studies identify effects of wealth or
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income through exogenous increases. These increases may result from either new public
programs (Case, 2004; Frijters et al., 2005; Chung and Kim, 2011; Robert, 2011), lottery
winnings (Lindahl, 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Apouey and Clark, 2010), or
inheritances (Meer et al., 2003; Kim and Ruhm, 2012). Findings from these studies suggest
that income from new public programs improves health status or health or life satisfaction
and that winning the lottery improves mental health. In contrast, receiving a bequest appears
to have no effect on various measures of health status, including ADL and IADL limitations,
self-reported health, and depression (Meer et al., 2003; Kim and Ruhm, 2012), and wealth
increases driven by stock market gains are not associated with improvements in physical
health (Smith, 2004).2
Two prior studies examine the health effects of decreases in income. Snyder and Evans
(2006) look at the effects of a legislative change affecting U.S. Social Security payments,
and find that persons receiving lower incomes as a result had significantly lower mortality
rates. Since reductions in Social Security, benefits may have increased employment
incentives, these results may reflect the social benefits of remaining in the labor force.
Sullivan and van Wachter (2009) find that job displacement led to large increases in short-
term mortality risk as well as smaller increases in long-term mortality risk. Their results
imply that income losses reduce longevity since short-term earnings losses were greater than
long-term earnings losses and since workers with larger earnings reductions experienced
larger increases in mortality. However, neither of these studies examines mental health
effects, nor can they isolate the effects of income changes versus changes in labor force
attachment.
Our work differs from prior studies of income decreases in several ways. Most notably, we
examine whether wealth losses have immediate effects on mental health, as opposed to long-
term or even one-year effects on mortality. A focus on mental health is supported by
psychology research linking wealth reductions to increased stress levels and linking
increased stress with depression and other mental illnesses (see, e.g., Rabkin and Struening,
1976; Schneiderman, Ironson, and Siegel, 2005). These types 0of effects can be observed in
relatively short periods of time; for example, depressive symptoms can emerge in as little as
two weeks and major life events such as assault, job loss, and financial or housing problems
can have mental health effects within one month (Dohrenwend, 1973; Kendler et al., 1999).3
Although other health consequences of the crash might emerge over a longer horizon, for
example, by the 2010 interview, we lack the ability to identify crash effects that far out since
the crash impacts every individual in the HRS by 2010. There is also less ambiguity about
the channels or mechanisms linking wealth to health compared to studies that focus on long-
run risk of mortality.
A downside to our approach is the short-term relationship between wealth and health may be
different from the long-term relationship. For example, looking at income increases, Evans
and Moore (2011) and (2012) find that having more income causes consumption and activity
levels to increase, and thereby leads to increased mortality in the short-term. Our study is
unable to examine whether the effects we observe are transient or permanent, although our
findings could help to elucidate some of the pathways leading to the long-term outcomes
observed in other studies of income loss.
1In this section we focus on studies linking individual or household income or wealth to health status. A separate literature has
examined the health consequences of macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Ruhm, 2000).
2There is some evidence that increases in income can worsen health behaviors. Kim and Ruhm (2012) report that receiving a bequest
increased recreational drinking; similarly, Apouey and Clark (2010) report increased drinking and smoking by lottery winners.
3Stress may subsequently worsen physical health as elevated stress hormones take their toll on the cardiovascular and immune
systems, but these effects may not be immediate (see, e.g., McEwen 1998; Schneiderman, Ironson, and Siegel, 2005).
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We also examine wealth fluctuations with the potential to affect a larger population of
individuals compared to events like winning the lottery or receiving an inheritance. The
2008 stock market crash was unanticipated and affected asset levels for all stockholders.
Because the effects of the crash were both large and sudden, our strategy differs from Smith
(2004) who used stock market changes in the 1990s to identify effects on physical health.
Smith found little evidence that exogenous wealth increases were timed with health
improvements. As noted above, it is possible that the effects of wealth losses differ from
those of wealth gains; if this is the case, our study of the events of the 2008 stock market
crash may be especially informative.4
Our study also contributes to a growing literature assessing the mental health consequences
of recent economic events. Currie and Tekin (2011) find that hospitalizations for psychiatric
conditions increased in regions especially hard-hit by the foreclosure crisis. Other recent
papers find that increases in the unemployment rate are associated with increased use of
antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications (Bradford and Lastrapes, 2013) and an uptick
in online, searches about depression and anxiety (Tefft, 2011).5
3. Methodological Approach
3.1. Identification Strategy
Our study employs data from several waves of the HRS, a nationally representative
longitudinal survey of more than 22,000 Americans over the age of 50. Respondents are
interviewed every two years and answer a wide array of questions pertaining to their
household wealth, income, mental health status and behaviors, among other topics. We use
HRS data from the Institute for Survey Research at the University of Michigan combined
with the RAND HRS Data, version K, which include key detailed wealth measures.
We use variation in respondents' 2008 interview dates to identify the effect of the stock
market crash on wealth and mental health. Figure 1 illustrates the daily closing values of the
DJIA during the fielding of the 2008 wave of the HRS. While all of the HRS 2008
interviews took place during an economic recession, respondents interviewed on or after
October 1 (roughly 8% of the sample in that wave) reported information about their wealth
and mental health in a very different financial climate than those interviewed in the weeks
and months before. Our identifying assumption is that the October 2008 stock market crash
acted as an exogenous shock to the wealth of a large fraction of Americans, especially those
with individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and other holdings in equity markets. Hudomiet
et al. (2011) use this same strategy to study the effect of the crash on households'
expectations about market returns; they also show that the 2008 interview date was not
significantly associated with HRS respondents' prior stock market expectations.6
Our estimation strategy uses first-difference models of wealth and mental health to test for
the effects of the crash. By examining changes between 2006 and 2008, rather than simply
comparing those interviewed before and after the crash, we difference out time-invariant
characteristics of respondents that might be related to both date of interview and mental
health outcomes. This is a key strength of our approach, since it addresses concerns that the
4Deaton (2012) examines changes in self-reported well-being in the U.S. population from 2008 to 2011, a period that includes the
2008 stock market crash. Using daily polling data from the Gallup Organization, he finds a sharp decline in well-being around the fall
of 2008 and a close association between well-being and the S&P 500 index between 2008 and 2010. However, the Gallup data do not
include measures of wealth, so questions about the effects of the crash on wealth and how the effects on well-being vary by stock
market exposure cannot be examined.
5Kuhn et al. (2009) find increased antidepressant and mental health care utilization among Austrian workers who lose jobs due to
plant closure.
6Specifically, the authors show that the coefficients on 2008 interview date dummies are not statistically significant in placebo
regression models of the level of and heterogeneity in respondents' stock market expectations in 2004 and 2006.
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respondents interviewed in the months near the end of the wave (and after the crash) are
different from those interviewed earlier in some unobservable ways. In a related study,
Ásgeirsdóttir et al. (2012) employ individual fixed effects models to examine the effect of
Iceland's financial crisis on health behaviors; the financial crisis is measured by an indicator
for 2009. Unlike their study, our identification approach employs both a treatment group
(respondents interviewed post October 1, 2008) and a comparison group (those interviewed
earlier) to test the effects of the crash, and we allow the treatment intensity to vary by
respondent's exposure to the crash. We describe these features in more detail below.7
We first use data on respondents in both 2006 and 2008 to estimate Equation (1) below:
(1)
Here ΔWi is the change in wealth between the 2006 and 2008 waves of the HRS. By
including the intercept term, β0, in the model, we effectively control for the common effect
of being interviewed in 2008 on the wealth of all HRS, respondents in the sample.8 Thus,
the key explanatory variable is POST, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 2008 survey
interview took place during or after October of that year (i.e., post-crash) and 0 otherwise.
The estimated coefficient on POST represents the effect of being interviewed after the crash
controlling for being interviewed in 2008. Observable differences in respondents that vary
over time and may contribute to differences in wealth (such as changes in household
income, employment, etc.) are represented by Χ.
We then allow the crash to have heterogeneous effects on wealth; in particular we examine
whether respondents who had more “exposure” to the crash suffered greater wealth losses.
We first estimate Equation (2) below:
(2)
Here, STOCK equals one if the respondent held any non-zero amount of wealth in stocks or
IRAs, and zero otherwise; NOSTOCK equals one if the respondent held no wealth in stocks
or IRAs, and zero otherwise. These variables measure exposure to the stock market crash;
we anticipate that the crash will impact respondents who own stocks and IRAs and have less
of an effect on those with no stock or IRA wealth.9 We define the respondent's exposure
using stock and IRA wealth in 2006 (prior to the crash); this addresses the concern that
portfolio allocations in 2008 reflect assets chosen because of crash-induced mental health
conditions (Bogan and Fertig, 2012). Estimates of α1 that are negative and larger (i.e., more
negative) than the estimates of α2 would support our hypothesis.
As a second test for heterogeneous effects, we estimate Equation (3) below:
7We choose to pool all respondents interviewed before and after the October 1, 2008 cutoff instead of using a regression discontinuity
approach for several reasons. First, the sample size is too small to support such an approach. Second, as we show later, not all
respondents interviewed after the crash are stockholders. This would imply that a fuzzy RD approach would be more appropriate;
however, the fluctuations in the DJIA shown in Figure 1 indicate that wealth loss is unlikely to be a smooth function of days from the
crash. Finally, the size of the response may be proportional to the size of the loss.
8We note that in a two-period setting, the intercept in a first-differences equation captures the change from period 1 to period 2 (see p.
463 in Wooldridge (2006)).
9This exposure measure does not capture all of the ways a respondent's wealth could be affected by stock market events. Some
respondents who have employer pensions or own mutual funds may also be exposed to the crash, and some of these respondents could
have no direct holdings of stock or IRAs. However, the HRS data do not permit us to measure whether the respondent's pension or
mutual fund consists of stocks or the percentage of the respondent's IRAs holdings that are held in stock, at least in our sample
(Gustman et al. (2011) do so for a much smaller sample of HRS respondents). Exposure to the crash might also depend on the
attributes of the respondent's pension plan, such as whether the plan is a defined contribution plan and how much of the respondent'
portfolio is held in stocks.
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(3)
Here we allow the effects of the crash to vary across three groups of respondents: those with
no wealth in stocks and IRAs (NOSTOCK), those with some wealth in stocks and IRAs
(LOWSTOCK), and those with more wealth in stocks and IRAs (HISTOCK). Specifically,
HISTOCK equals one if the respondent had stock and IRA wealth levels at or above the
median wealth of stockholders (in terms of wealth in stocks and IRAs, not their overall
wealth), and zero otherwise; LOWSTOCK equals one if the respondent had stock and IRA
wealth levels that placed them in the less wealthy half of stockholders (again, in terms of the
amount of wealth in stocks and IRAs), and zero otherwise.10 Again we expect that exposure
increases with the amount of wealth held in stocks/IRA; this specification allows the effects
of increased exposure to be non-linear. As in equation (2), respondent exposure is based on
2006 wealth holdings. In this case, support for our hypothesis would come from negative
estimates of δ1 that are larger (i.e., more negative) than estimates of δ2 and δ3. We estimate
Equations (1) through (3) for both absolute changes in wealth and proportional changes in
wealth (i.e., changes in the natural log of wealth). Proportional changes may be more salient
to respondents given the way stock market performance is reported and in light of
diminishing marginal utility in wealth.11
To examine the effect of crash-induced wealth losses on health, we estimate Equation (4)
below:
(4)
where H represents one of several clinical and subjective measures of mental health
described below. This reduced form specification also allows the effects of the crash to vary
by the respondent's exposure to the crash.
3.2. Data
We estimate our regression models using two samples of HRS respondents constructed as
follows. Of the combined respondents to the 2006 and 2008 waves (35,686 respondents), we
include respondents with non-proxy interviews in both waves (n=30,508), designated as the
financial respondent in the household in both waves (n=20,708),12 and born no later than
1953 (n=20,040).13 The resulting sample includes 10,020 unique financial respondents. We
also define a second estimation sample that excludes respondents in the top 1% and the
bottom 1% of 2006 non-housing wealth, leaving us with 19,642 respondents in both years,
or 9,821 unique respondents.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the first estimation sample by year of interview and
for respondents interviewed after the 2008 crash. Our main measure of wealth is real non-
10In results described below, we also tested an alternative definition of exposure to the crash. In these alternative specifications, we
estimate equation (3) but instead define LOWSTOCK and HISTOCK based on the percentage of the respondent's portfolio that is held
in stock/IRA assets.
11While a large literature also explores the health effects of relative income (income compared to one's peers, for example), we do not
pursue that approach because of the challenge of identifying the appropriate reference groups in the HRS.
12There is one financial respondent for almost every household interviewed in the HRS. In one-respondent households, the sole
respondent is the financial respondent; in two-respondent households, the financial respondent answered household-level financial
questions on behalf of the entire household. This respondent was determined based on the answer to the question: “Which member of
your immediate family is most knowledgeable about your family's assets, debts and retirement planning?”
13We exclude persons born after 1953 because the HRS was designed to be representative of individuals aged 51-61 and the youngest
cohort added to the 2008 HRS core sample of respondents was born no later than 1954. This exclusion leads us to drop spouses of
age-eligible persons who, while interviewed, were not the focus of the sample design.
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housing wealth, reported in 2008 dollars. This is defined in the RAND HRS data as the total
of non-housing assets less debt, where non-housing assets are the amounts of wealth held in
checking and savings accounts, CDs, savings bonds and Treasury bills, bonds, total IRA
accounts, stocks, mutual funds, real estate other than housing, vehicles, businesses, plus
other savings and assets. On average, real non-housing wealth declined from $344,491 in
2006 to $292,861 in 2008. As expected, the size of this decline was more severe among the
respondents whose 2008 interview took place on or after October 1 of that year. For that
group of 815 respondents, non-housing wealth fell by an average of 46%, from $506,150 in
2006 to $271,484 in 2008.14 Mean changes in non-housing wealth are large in magnitude
because losses are concentrated among households with sufficient wealth to have stock
market exposure. The mean household experienced losses of $51,630 from 2006 to 2008,
while the median household reported losses of only $5,889.
Non-housing wealth is our preferred wealth measure because it includes IRA accounts
which are likely to be impacted by the crash. As a robustness check we also examine
financial wealth, defined in the RAND HRS data as total financial assets less debt, including
checking and savings accounts, CDs, savings bonds and Treasury bills, bonds, stocks,
mutual funds, plus other savings and assets, but excluding IRA accounts. However, this
exclusion makes financial wealth less suitable for our study because IRA account owners
face considerable exposure to the market. Gustman et al. (2011) report that, among the early
boomer HRS cohort, 73% of IRA assets were held in stocks (see Table 1 of their study).
We use six measures of HRS respondents' mental health. The first two are clinically-
validated measures of depressive symptoms or depression based on the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression or CES-D scale, which was designed to measure
depressive symptoms in the general population (Radloff, 1977). The HRS version of the
CES-D includes eight of the 20 items in the standard index; the items ask respondents to
report whether or not in the past week they felt depressed, happy, lonely, sad, etc.15 We
create a CES-D index by summing the number of negative symptoms and reverse coding the
positive symptoms (Steffick, 2000), so that higher values of the index indicate more
depressive symptoms. We also employ a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent reports
three or more depressive symptoms from the CES-D scale and 0 otherwise. As Shane et al.
(2008) report, a score of three or more on the eight-item CES-D corresponds with a score of
16 or more on the 20-item CES-D, which indicates clinical depression. This measure has
been used as an indicator of major depression in the HRS following validation by Turvey et
al. (1999). We also use a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reported regularly
taking prescription medications to help relieve anxiety or depression and 0 otherwise.
We then examine several subjective measures of mental health; these outcomes help to
capture feelings of depression that may occur absent a diagnosis of clinical depression. We
examine a binary indicator equal to one if the respondent reported “feeling depressed” in the
past week, and zero otherwise. We also examine two measures of self-reported health; one is
a scale measure ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent); the other is a binary indicator for
excellent/very good health. Schnittker (2005) shows that self-reported health status is
closely associated with mental health among older adults.
14Note that this is the combined decline in wealth from losses and sales. Respondents who sold stock after their 2006 interview can be
identified in the 2008 wave, but the specific dates of stock sales are not identified; therefore we are unable to examine the link
between decisions to sell stock and the stock market crash.
15Four other items in the 8-item CES-D scale ask whether “everything is an effort”, whether “sleep is restless”, and whether the
respondent “enjoys life” and “cannot get going.” The HRS also contains a short form of the Composite International Diagnostic
Interview (CIDI-SF) but because these interview questions pertain to symptoms within the last 12 months and because we are
interested in symptoms experienced at the interview date, we do not use it in our analysis.
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As seen in Table 1, there was a slight decline among all respondents in both the CES-D
index and the indicator for having three or more depressive symptoms from 2006 to 2008.
Among respondents interviewed post-crash, mean CES-D and the proportion of respondents
with three or more depressive symptoms decreased over time to a lesser extent than in the
full sample. A similar pattern is observed for subjective feelings of depression: the share of
all financial respondents who reported feeling depressed fell from 16.8% to 13.4% between
2006 and 2008, but among those whose 2008 interview took place post-crash, there was a
smaller decline from 18.2% to 16.6%. The proportion of all financial respondents taking
antidepressants was relatively stable between 2006 and 2008, but it rose by nearly one
percentage point among those interviewed post-crash.
Table 1 also compares post-crash respondents to the full sample in terms of their
demographic, economic, and other traits. Respondents interviewed later in the year in 2008
are younger, have higher household incomes, and are more likely to work and less likely to
be retired. This pattern is consistent with reports that respondents interviewed later in the
wave are those who are hardest to schedule.16 Post-crash respondents are similar to the
larger sample in terms of sex, race, education, marital status, and cognitive function. We
looked for evidence of hard-to-observe differences in current health status by comparing the
percentage of 2008 financial respondents who died by 2010 by broadly-defined interview
dates. Mortality rates were fairly similar; 7.8% of respondents interviewed in the first six
months of the 2008 wave (February-June 2008) had died by 2010, compared to 7.6% of
respondents interviewed in the last six months of the 2008 wave (September 2008-February
2009). Nonetheless, to address concerns about differences in the post-crash group that might
be correlated with wealth and/or mental health, our regression models include a number of
controls for time-varying individual or household traits. The full set of explanatory variables
includes measures of cross-wave transitions in marital status, employment status, and
retirement status,17 changes in household income and its square, changes in household size
and cognitive function, controls for the onset of various physical health conditions across
waves,18 the time between waves (measured in months and months squared), and two
indicator variables to control for changes in the season in which the interview takes place.19
As noted above, the first-difference specification controls for time-invariant traits that may
be correlated with the post-crash indicator and our outcomes of interest, whether these traits
are observed (such as race, sex, education) or unobserved (such as risk preference).20
16See Hudomiet et al. (2011), who also state that respondents interviewed later may be harder to locate and more reluctant to be
interviewed (p. 402).
17Controls for both retirement and employment status are included because some respondents are employed during retirement.
Cognitive impairment is associated with depression and may also be associated with changes in spending for nursing home care and
thus wealth.
18The physical health conditions are cancer, diabetes, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, arthritis, and hypertension. We include
separate indicators for each condition. To preserve sample sizes we also include a set of controls for whether the respondent is missing
data on a given indicator, and then recode the indicator to zero.
19The designation known as SAD, or seasonal affective disorder, links the onset of depressive symptoms to decreases in daylight
timed with fall and winter months. For example, Tefft (2012) shows that more hours of darkness are associated with adverse mental
health and employment outcomes. These controls help to account for the possibility that respondents in our sample were interviewed
at different times of the year in the 2006 and 2008 waves and that the onset of seasonal depression might be correlated with being
interviewed post-crash in 2008. We include a dummy equal to one if the respondent's interview changed from a fall/winter month to a
spring/summer month between 2006 and 2008 (and zero otherwise), and a second dummy equal to one if the respondent's interview
changed from a spring/summer month to a fall/winter month across the two waves (and zero otherwise). Certain HRS design features
(namely an oversample of both Floridians and Hispanics) also help to mitigate concerns of SAD for respondents who live in regions
with perpetually summery weather. We obtained similar results when we used a set of month of interview dummy variables in place of
the seasonal change in indicators.
20It is possible that some of the control variables are themselves affected by the crash (e.g., income). As a robustness check, we
examine the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of household income and other controls. These results are described below.
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4. Empirical Results
4.1. Effects of the Stock Market Crash on Wealth
Table 2 presents estimates of the effects of the crash on absolute changes in respondent
wealth, where wealth is measured as total non-housing wealth. Columns (1) and (2) report
the estimated post-crash coefficient from Equation (1) using the sample of all financial
respondents and then excluding the top and bottom 1% of the wealth distribution. In the full
sample, the crash had a statistically significant effect on non-housing wealth, reducing it by
more than $238,000. In the trimmed sample, the crash reduced wealth by almost $44,000,
but the effect is not statistically significant. The sizes of these effects are consistent with the
asset declines reported by Bricker et al. (2012).
The remaining columns of Table 2 illustrate the importance of allowing for heterogeneous
effects. We first allow the effect of the crash to vary between those with any stock/IRA
wealth in 2006 (who comprise 47.2% of respondents) and those with no stock/IRA wealth
(the remaining 52.8%), as in Equation (2). In columns (3) and (4) we report the post-crash
coefficients from this equation for both the full and the trimmed samples. In both samples,
the post-crash coefficient defined for stockholders (POST*STOCK) is negative and
significant, and much larger in absolute value than the post-crash coefficient defined for
nonstockholders. The estimated post-crash coefficient for non-stockholders is also
statistically insignificant. The results from the trimmed sample, for example, suggest that the
crash caused wealth declines of more than $81,000 among respondents with any stock/IRA
wealth, but led to no significant changes in wealth for respondents without stocks or IRAs.
We then allow the effects of the crash to vary across respondents in the top half of the stock/
IRA wealth distribution in 2006 (23.6% of respondents), those in the bottom half of the
stock/IRA wealth distribution (another 23.6%), and those with no stock/IRA wealth (the
remaining 52.8%). As seen in columns (5) and (6) the crash effect varies by exposure in
both the full and trimmed samples. Effects are largest for those in the top half of the stock/
IRA wealth distribution (e.g., in the trimmed sample, the crash caused wealth losses of
$223,581), and statistically insignificant for the other types of respondents. Results from χ2
tests in both samples allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the post-crash coefficients are
equal among the top half of stockholders and the non-stockholders (p<0.001).21
Table 3 presents regression results from models of proportional changes in respondent
wealth. The sample sizes are about 20% smaller because several hundred respondents in
each year report zero or negative values of total non-housing wealth. Although the average
post-crash effect is not statistically significant (in columns 1 and 2), there are significant
heterogeneous effects that vary by the respondent's exposure to the crash. Respondents who
had some stock or IRA wealth in 2006 lost about 27-30% of their total non-housing wealth
as a result of the crash, and respondents in the top-half of the stock/IRA wealth distribution
in 2006 lost about half of their wealth as a result of the crash. As a robustness check, we
estimate models from Tables 2 and 3 using financial wealth as a dependent variable; recall
that this more narrowly-focused measure includes stocks and mutual funds but excludes IRA
accounts. As expected the coefficients of the post-crash indicator variable and interaction
21We also estimated models of non-housing wealth where we allowed the effect of the crash to varyacross respondents with no stock/
IRA wealth, those with low stock/IRA wealth, and those with high stock/IRA wealth (as in Table 2, columns 5 and 6), but in which we
defined “high” and “low” stock/IRA respondents based on the share of the respondent's wealth held in stocks/IRAs (instead of the
level). That is, high stock respondents were those whose share of wealth in stocks/IRAs was above the median share among stock/IRA
owners, and low stock respondents are those whose share of wealth was below the median. The share is defined as the amount of
wealth in stocks and IRA divided by the total value of wealth including the value of a second home. Because this approach uses two
wealth measures, it introduces some measurement error in the post interaction terms and yields a slightly smaller sample because of
missing values in total wealth. Results are available upon request.
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terms are smaller, but the pattern is the same as that seen for non-housing wealth (see
Appendix Tables A1 and A2). Clearly, the events on Wall Street had very different effects
on wealth depending on a given respondent's exposure to the stock market.
4.2. Falsification and Placebo Tests
While the stock market crash was closely timed with the start of October 2008 (see Figure
1), the post-crash coefficients could be picking up effects of other coincident events or
correlated factors, and not the effect of the crash per se. For example, the downturn in the
housing market is particularly important to consider since the housing crisis itself may have
led to worsening mental health.22 Another possibility is that there is something
unobservable about the respondents interviewed late in the 2008 wave of the HRS that
makes them more prone to wealth losses than the other respondents, regardless of what is
happening on Wall Street. For example, these respondents may have preferences for more
aggressive portfolio allocations and experience greater wealth volatility. Even though we
estimate first-difference models, we examine both of these possibilities.
First, we consider whether the post-crash indicators could be picking up declines in housing
wealth. This is possible since our broadly-defined measure of non-housing wealth includes
real estate other than housing. We examine the timing of the housing crisis relative to
October 2008 using data from the Federal Housing Finance Authority's House Price Index.
23
 Figure 2A plots the index, based on all transactions, which includes new home purchases
and refinancing appraisals for existing homeowners; these data represent the most
comprehensive information respondents might have about the value of their home. Figure
2B plots seasonally-adjusted data based on home sales only. In each graph, we show
national trends (solid line) and the trend at the time of HRS interview (dashed line). The
HRS trends are constructed by matching HRS respondents to housing information for their
state of residence during the quarter of their interview. Both figures show that the HRS
sample is representative of national trends, and moreover, that the housing crisis began
much earlier than the October 2008 crash. Figure 2A suggests that, if anything, national
housing prices were starting to recover in the post-crash period relative to the pre-crash
period. As a result, respondents interviewed after the crash may report smaller changes in
real estate values than pre-crash respondents. Thus, any confounding of our estimates from
the foreclosure crisis and decline in housing wealth should bias us towards finding no effect
of the crash.
We next conduct a falsification test using housing wealth as defined by HRS respondents.
For this exercise, we estimate the same series of models shown in Equations (1) through (3)
and where the dependent variable is housing wealth. Table 4 reports results from models of
the net value of the primary residence. We see no evidence that respondents interviewed
after October 2008 saw declines in housing wealth. In all but one case, the coefficients of
the post-crash indicator or the post-crash interaction terms are positive. We get similar
results when we use a, dependent variable defined as the gross value of the primary
residence (results are available upon request).24
22For example, Currie and Tekin (2011) find that the foreclosure crisis was associated with an increase in medical visits for anxiety,
suicide attempts, and stress-related physical complaints.
23Figures 2A and 2B report the Purchase Only Index and All Transactions Index, US Summary and Census Divisions through
2012Q1 and States through 2012Q1, obtained from the Federal, Housing Authority and available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
Default.aspx?Page=87 (accessed 6 August 2012). The All Transactions Index includes data on refinancing and home purchases, while
the Purchase Only Index includes only home purchases. National data are reported monthly, and state-level totals are available
quarterly.
24These results might also be evidence that respondents' assessments of the value of their homes are very imprecise.
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Next, we consider the possibility that respondents interviewed late in 2008 differ in some
unobservable way that makes them more prone to wealth losses across waves, regardless of
events in the stock market. We estimate a series of placebo regressions similar to the
specifications shown by Equations (1) through (3), but in which the dependent variable is
the change in wealth between 2004 and 2006 and the POST indicator is, as before, defined
from the date of interview in 2008. Evidence that a post-crash interview date in 2008 is not
associated with changes in wealth, relative to the comparison group, would provide the
strongest support for our identification strategy.25 This test serves as an effective placebo
test regarding wealth changes in 2008 if there were no sizable changes in stock market
returns between 2004 and 2006 and if the treatment group (i.e., those interviewed at the end
of the 2008 survey) were evenly distributed across the 2006 survey dates. However, the
DJIA closing values did not remain flat through the 2006 wave, and instead were generally
increasing over the months that the 2006 survey (wave 8) was fielded.26 In addition, those
interviewed post-crash in 2008 (at the end of the 2008 survey period) were more than twice
as likely to have been interviewed at the end of the 2006 survey period. For these reasons,
we might expect the treatment group to experience an increase in wealth between 2004 and
2006 relative to the comparison group. That is, since our treatment group was also more
likely to be interviewed late in the fielding of the 2006 HRS, the higher stock returns at the
end of this survey period are expected to result in, larger gains for the treatment group
between 2004 and 2006. Although this means that these placebo regressions might also be
picking up changes in wealth that are a result of changes in the stock market, it does allow
us to test whether the treatment group is more prone to wealth losses than the comparison
group.
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 5. There is no evidence that respondents
with a post-crash interview in 2008 were more likely to experience wealth losses between
the 2004 and 2006 waves. As expected, there is some evidence that respondents interviewed
in October 2008 or later had larger wealth increases. We conduct a similar series of placebo
tests in which the dependent variable is the change in financial wealth across the 2004 and
2006 waves. The results, reported in Appendix Table A3, are similar. In no case is having a
post-crash interview date in 2008 associated with significant declines in wealth across the
earlier waves. Even though there may be some differences between respondents interviewed
in October 2008 or later and those interviewed earlier in the year, we find no evidence that
the treatment group is more prone to sizable reductions in wealth.
4.3. Effects of the Stock Market Crash on Mental Health
Table 6 reports the reduced form estimates of the effects from the stock market crash on six
different measures of mental health. The top panel reports results from models of clinically-
validated depression measures based on the CES-D index and from a model of
antidepressant use. The bottom panel reports results using subjective measures of mental
health.
Columns 1 and 2 report the estimated effects of the crash on the number of
depressivesymptoms. Respondents who owned no stock/IRA accounts were not affected by
the crash, while thewealthier half of stockholders reported more depressive symptoms after
the crash. However, thelatter effect is not statistically significant, and the less wealthy half
of stockholders reported significantly fewer depressive symptoms after the crash than the
other groups. Columns 3 and 4, report results from models of having three or more
symptoms from the CES-D scale; these provide little evidence that the crash led to clinically
25This placebo test is similar to the one reported in Hudomiet et al. (2011).
26Between March and September 2006, the closing value of the DJIA ranged from 10,667 to 11,718. The closing value was higher in
the latter half of the survey period, ranging from 11,670 to 12,786 between October 2006 and February 2007.
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significant increases in depressive symptoms. None of the post-crash interactions is
statistically significant, and the crash effect is relatively large and negative among
respondents who hold less than the median value of stock wealth.27,28
Despite the absence of effects on clinically-validated measures of depression, the results in
columns 5 and 6 suggest that antidepressant use increased following the stock market crash
among those with large stock holdings. Antidepressant use rose among the wealthier half of
stockholding respondents by 6.2 percentage points, or nearly 35% from a base of 17.6
percent. We tested whether this medication use masked an increase in major depression by
reclassifying respondents reporting anti-depressant use as having 3 or more symptoms; again
we fail to find significant changes in clinical depression among those affected by the crash.
An interesting question is whether increased antidepressant use that occurs without a
corresponding uptick in clinical depression represents “inappropriate” medication use,
although the HRS limits our ability to differentiate between inappropriate use and successful
treatment of depressive episodes that emerge between HRS waves. Nonetheless, our
antidepressant result is robust to specifications excluding all respondents who did not meet
the clinical depression threshold in either 2006 or 2008 but began taking antidepressants
between their 2006 and 2008 interviews. The POST x HIGH STOCK interaction term
remains positive and statistically significant, although the coefficient is smaller (at 0.049,
compared to 0.062 in the main estimation sample). Bradford and Lastrapes (2013) find an
increase in the use of antidepressants without an increase in mental health office visits
during times of rising unemployment; they note that this might represent the use of
prescription drugs to substitute for potentially more costly (in terms of co-payments, patient
time, or both) office-based treatments by mental health professionals.
Although the crash had no effect on indicators of clinical depression, the results inthe
bottom panel of Table 6 show that it increased the likelihood of feeling depressed among the
wealthier half of stockholding respondents. For that group, the stock market crash increased
the probability of feeling depressed by 8.2 percentage points, or nearly 50% from a base of
16.6 percent.29 The remaining columns of Table 6 also provide evidence that the crash
worsened subjective measures of health among respondents with relatively large holdings in
stock. Specifically, both groups of stockholders reported significantly worse self-rated
health post-crash, and the post-crash coefficient is larger for the wealthier half of
stockholders than it is for the less wealthy half. Interestingly, the crash-induced reductions in
self-reported health are driven by a decline in respondent reports of very good or excellent
health, and not from an increase in fair or poor health (results from models of fair/poor
health are available upon request). This may be explained by the fact that respondents with
more wealth (and more stock market exposure) are, overall, more likely to report excellent
or very good health and less likely to report fair or poor health.
We tested the robustness of the health findings to various specification changes. First, we
examined how sensitive our results were to alternate definitions, of the treatment and control
groups, since Figure 1 suggests that the DJIA began to experience some declines in June
(although these declines were much smaller than those experienced in the fall 2008), and in
27Results were very similar when the dependent variable was defined as 1 if the respondent had four or more depressive symptoms
(and 0 otherwise).
28Since antidepressants may mask depressive symptoms, we tested whether there was an impact of large wealth losses on this
clinically-validated measure of depression when we exclude individuals who report taking antidepressants in either 2006 or 2008 from
the estimation sample. We still find no effect.
29Additional analysis also shows a longer lag in antidepressant use than in feelings of depression following the crash. In results
available upon request, we find a large increase in the likelihood of feeling depressed in the month of and the month following the
crash; in contrast, increases in the likelihood of taking antidepressants are larger at two to three months post-crash than in the month of
and the month after the crash.
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light of the various events taking place in the summer and early fall of 2008, such as the
declining value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stocks and the bankruptcy filing by Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc. In one specification we used all respondents and defined the
treatment group as those interviewed from June 2008 on; we obtained similar results but the
size of the crash effects on wealth, feelings of depression and self-rated health were smaller,
as would be expected. In another specification we excluded respondents interviewed
between June and September and defined the treatment group as those interviewed from
October 2008 on; we obtained larger point estimates for the effects of the crash on feelings
of depression and excellent/very good self-reported health, but in the latter case, the standard
errors increased (perhaps not surprising since the sample size fell by 37%). In one set of
models, we dropped controls for the household income and physical health conditions, given
the possible endogeneity of the variables. In another set of models, we dropped all controls
including those for changes in cognitive impairment and transitions in marital status, work
and retirement. We added a control of the onset of mental health chronic conditions, which
we originally excluded out of concerns about endogeneity. In almost all cases, the results are
substantively the same as those reported in Table 6.
We estimated a set of placebo regressions similar to those shown for wealth; these use the
changes in mental health measures between 2004 and 2006 as the dependent variables, and a
set of “fake” post-crash variables as the key explanatory variables. Table 7 shows the
results; since the 2004 wave of the HRS does not contain the question on antidepressant use
we are unable to conduct a placebo test with this measure. Evidence that the fake post-crash
variables worsened mental health among respondents with stock and IRA holdings would,
call our identification strategy into question. In contrast, Table 7 shows that respondents
interviewed later in 2008 did not experience worsening mental health between the 2004 and
2006 waves. That said, we do not see improvements in subjective mental health for the
wealthier half of stockholders despite the fact that we see positive impacts on wealth for this
group (in Table 5). This may be explained by asymmetric effects of wealth on mental health,
which may also help to reconcile our results with those from Smith (2004), who reported
that the gradual stock market wealth accumulations in the 1990s were not associated with
improvements in physical health.
Finally, we explored the possibility of using the post-crash indicators to instrument for
changes in wealth. For this to be a valid identification strategy, the crash of 2008 must affect
respondents' mental health only through its effect on wealth. Both theoretical arguments and
first-stage diagnostic testing raised concerns about the validity of this approach. For
example, the crash could impact other types of wealth that we are not able to measure (e.g.,
pension plan accumulations) or the crash could impact mental health by raising anxieties
about children's financial or employment prospects in addition to own wealth losses. For this
reason, the exclusion restriction would not be satisfied.
5. Summary and Discussion
In this study we exploit the exogenous variation in wealth created by the crash to address a
question of long-standing interest in the health economic and social epidemiology
literatures: what is the causal effect of wealth on different dimensions of health? Our study
adds to a number of careful studies in the area but is unique in that we examine the
immediate effects of sudden wealth losses on mental health. In comparison, the prior studies
on the effects of income losses focus on mortality, and the prior studies on mental health
effects examine increases in income.
We find new evidence that the stock market crash of 2008 altered subjective measures of
mental health for respondents with large holdings of stock. In reduced form specifications,
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we estimate that respondents whose wealth was most affected by the crash (and who lost
nearly $250,000 as a result), had a nearly 50% increase in the likelihood of feeling depressed
and a nearly 20% reduction in the likelihood of reporting excellent or very good health.
However, we find no evidence that the wealth losses associated with the crash affected
clinically-validated measures of depressive symptoms and indicators of depression.
Respondents whose wealth was most affected by the crash experienced no significant
changes in a summary score from the CES-D scale for depression or in a binary indicator of
depression based on having three or more symptoms. Despite there being no change in signs
of clinical depression, respondents who experienced large wealth losses and reductions in
subjective health also exhibited a sizeable 35% increase in the likelihood of taking
antidepressants. One explanation for this pattern of findings is that respondents who
experience wealth losses deal with the resulting bad feelings by using antidepressant drugs
inappropriately, i.e., when clinical symptoms of depression are not present. If so, this
suggests a need for additional studies to support clearer guidelines for antidepressant use and
prescribing practices, particularly pharmacological treatments for patients who have
experienced shocks such as job loss or death of a loved one, a controversial clinical area
(e.g., Mazure et al., 2000; Simon, 2013). Alternatively, the increased medication use may
reflect prophylactic prescription use that staved off major depressive episodes; a growing
literature suggests that use of mental health treatments increases among groups exposed to
adverse macroeconomic conditions.
A limitation of our study is that we use an identification strategy that permits us to examine
only the short-term mental health effects of the crash. Prior studies have found that subjects
interviewed nearly two years after devastating events that result in large financial losses
(e.g., involuntary job loss and bank fraud) showed increased rates of clinical depression
(Gallo et al., 2000; Ganzini et al., 1990). Even though we do not observe immediate
increases in clinically-validated measures of depression following large wealth losses, there
may be more severe long-term consequences that we are unable to quantify.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the health consequences of adverse
economic shocks, which includes studies of the recent U.S. foreclosure and economic crises
by Currie and Tekin (2011), Deaton (2012) and Burgard et al. (2012) and research on
Iceland's financial crisis by Ásgeirsdóttir et al. (2012). Like these other works, our study
finds that severe macroeconomic events have important consequences for health, in addition
to their effects on retirement plans and expectations (Coile and Levine, 2009; McFall, 2011).
Appendix Table A1: Absolute Changes in Financial Wealth, 2006 to 2008
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Appendix Table A2: Proportional Changes in Financial Wealth, 2006 to 2008
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Appendix Table A3: Placebo Effects on Changes in Financial Wealth, 2004
to 2006
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Figure 1. DJIA Daily Closing Value by 2008 HRS Fielding Date
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Figure 2A. FHFA House Price Index, All Transactions
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Figure 2B. FHFA House Price Index, Purchase Only, Adjusted
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for HRS Financial Respondents
Full Sample (n=10,020) Interviewed Post-Crash (n=815)
2006 2008 2006 2008
Non-housing wealth (2008 $) 344,491 (1,912,915) 292,861** (974,735) 506,150 (3,863,789) 271,484* (739,056)
Financial wealth (2008 $) 147,471 (1,115,278) 133,699 (546,440) 140,331 (634,355) 113,830 (394,535)
CES-D 1.54 1.48** 1.65 1.62
CES-D>=3 23.2% 21.7%** 24.7% 24.8%
Rx for depression 15.3% 15.5% 16.7% 17.6%
Feels depressed 16.8% 13.4%*** 18.2% 16.6%
Self-Reported (SR) health (1=exc., 5=poor) 2.84 2.94*** 2.82 2.94**
Excellent/very good SR health 40.4% 37.3%*** 40.4% 38.9%
Age 68.73 (9.87) 70.7*** (9.89) 65.99 (9.67) 68.31*** (9.73)
Female 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.59
Black 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
Hispanic 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Other race 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06
Less than high school 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Some college 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
College degree 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Advanced degree 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Other education 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007
Education missing 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Never married 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Widowed 0.28 0.30** 0.24 0.27
Separated/divorced 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
Marital status missing 0 0.0004** 0 0.002
Household income (in 2008 $) 60,080 (184,595) 62,102 (610,002) 70,812 (120,803) 75,348 (272,277)
No. persons in household 2.00 (1.14) 1.98* (1.12) 2.13 (1.28) 2.09 (1.34)
Cognitive impairment category 1.23 (0.50) 1.26*** (0.54) 1.22 (0.50) 1.25 (0.54)
Notes: The sample size in the column header row refers to the number of respondents with non-missing data on wealth. Missing data on mental
health measures results in fewer observations. Statistically significant differences between 2008 and 2006 values are indicated by *** for 0.01
level, ** for 0.05 level, and * for 0.10 level.
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